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ABSTRACT
The relevance of imperfect competition for models of aggregate economic
fluctuations has received increased attention from researchers in both
macroeconomics and industrial organization. Measuring properly the size
of industry markups of price over marginal cost is important both for
assessing the role of market structure and for determining the extent to
which excess capacity is a significant feature accompanying imperfect
competition in American industry. Using a panel data set on four—digit
Census manufacturing industries, this paper expand8 recent work by
Robert Hall on the importance of market structure for understanding
cyclical fluctuations.
We outline a methodology for estimating industry markups of price over
cost and the influence of market structure on cyclical movements in
total factor productivity. While we find evidence to support the
proposition that price exceeds marginal cost In U.S. manufacturing, our
results offer only limited support for the notion that markups are
importantly related to differences in Industry concentration, though the
effect of unionization is important. Concentration effects are
important only in industries producing durable goods or differentiated
con8umer goods. In addition, much of the estimated markup of price over
marginal cost is accounted for by fixed costs related to overhead labor,
advertising, and central office expenses; we do not find compelling















Evanston, IL 60201I •IWRODUCTION
Therelevance of imperfect competition for models of aggregate
economic fluctuations has received increased attention from researchers
in both macroeconomics and industrial organization.1 In particular,
Rail has focused attention in a series of papers (1986a, 1986b, 1986c,
1986d) on the importance of market structure for understanding cyclical
fluctuations. He shows (1986b) that price substantially exceeds
marginal cost in many (two—digit—level) industries, evidence against the
hypothesis of perfect competition, and that the gap between price and
marginal cost explains the procyclical movements in total factor
productivity long studied in empirical macroeconomics. The excess of
price over marginal cost is reconciled with the observation of low
average profit rates in most industries by asserting the importance of
excess capacity.
Measuring properly the size of industry markups of price over
marginal cost is important both for assessing the role of market
structure and for determining the extent to which excess capacity is a
significant feature accompanying imperfect competition in American
industry. There is a long tradition in applied industrial organization
of estimating the influence of market structure and industry
characteristics on calculated (usually Census measures of) price—cost
margins (see the reviews of studies in Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen,
1986a, 1986b). In this paper, we present a new method for estimating
thegap between price aridmarginal cost for various groups of
industries,and discuss its importance for explaining observed
procyclicalmovements intotalfactor productivity. This newapproach
avoidsmany of the problems with inferring information about markups ofprice over marginal cost from Census price—cost margins, which are
calculated with respect to average variable cost (see the discussion in
Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen, 1986c).
Our departure from Hall's pioneering effort centers on two areas of
empirical refinement. First, we focus on manufacturing, and make use of
a more disaggregated panel data set of 284 four—digit S.I.C. industries
to consider a richer description of Dotential market structure
influences on cyclical fluctuations stemming from interindustry
variation in concentration, import competition, and unionization.
Second, we take into account the importance of intermediate inputs
("materials") in production. This addition turns out to be important
for assessing the extent of realized industry market power (as measured
by the markup of price over cost). We use these modifications to
evaluate conclusions about the significance of imperfect competition for
cyclical fluctuations.
The paper is organized as follows. Our methodology for estimating
industry price—cost markups and the influence of market structure on
cyclical movements in total factor productivity (the "Solow residual')
is outlined in section II, We present econometric tests of alternative
explanations of observed procyclical movements in the Solow residual in
section III. In particular, we cast doubt on the "real business cycle"
interpretation——i.e., that procyclical movements in the Solow residual
are consistent with perfect competition in the presence of productivity
disturbances common across industries. While we find evidence to
support the proposition that price exceeds marginal cost in American
manufacturing, our results offer only limited support for the notion
that markups are importantly related to differences in industry—2
concentration,though the effect of unionization is quantitatively
important. Concentration effects are important only in industries
producing durable goods or differentiated consumer good8. In section
IV,weattempt to reconcile the price—cost margins calculated in section
IIwith thelow average profit rates observed in manufacturing. Much of
the price—cost margin is accounted for by fixed costs related to
overhead labor, advertising, and central office expenses; we do not find
compelling evidence of substantial excess capacity in most industries.
Conclusions and implications are reviewed in section V.
II•MARKETSTRUCTUREAND CfCLICAL P)VEMENTS INPRODUCTIVITY
Modeling Strategy
We approach the task of iasurng the relevance of departures of
price from marginal costby modifying the framework suggested by Hall.
Consider first a sirn"le production function in which, for the ith
industryinperiod t, output Qisproduced with constant returns to
scale from capital K and labor L according to
(1) —AeKjf(Lj/Ki),
whereA and y represent a neutral shift in productivity and the rate of
flicks—neutral technical progress, respectively. Let q —
andlet £Ln(L/K). Then, as notedby Hall, differentiatingwith
respect to time and approximating with discrete changes yields—3—
1'
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wherea —inA. Using the definition of marginal cost as the ratio of
the wage to the marginal product of labor, we express the markup of




That is. B has the interpretation of a price—cost margin (i.e.,
(P—MC)/P). Using this expression, we can rewrite (2) as
=1i
+Aa+ Lift
Denotingthe labor share by L' we can reexpress (4) as
(5) —
ctL6t 1
+Ia1—8 ) ÷ +u.
where u is a random error term in productivity, which is assumed to be
uncorrelated with aggregate fluctuations.2 Given this assumption about
the error term, it is the excess of price over marginal cost which gives
rise to a positive estimate of B.
This estimate of the markup of price over marginal cost is upward
biased because of the exclusion of materials in the calculation of
marginal cost. Only in the (unlikely) case wherein the change in
materials use is uncorrelated with the change in output will estimates
of the margin be unbiased. If, however, materials use changes in strict
proportion to output, the formula governing the relationship between the—4
ratio of price to marginal costbasedon value added iandthe true
markup ucanbe expressed as
U
1 +(3J—1),
whereis the ratio of materials cost to the value of output (see also
Hall, 1986b).3 For average materials shares in manufacturing, th
potential mismeasurement of the markup is quite large.
More generally, of course, production is a function of intermediate
inputs as well——i.e., "materials." We let M denote materials, so
that mLn(M/K) and represents the materials share in the value of
output. It is straightforward to show that
(6) qft —Litft —aMImj Y1 18jt +
+8q+u
it it it
Using aggregate time—series data andindividualtime—series for
two—digit industries, Hall emphasized that a positfve estimate of B
reflects the idea that the Solow (1957) residual measure of the growth
rate of total factor productivity (the left—hand side of equation (6))
can he explained by the deviation of price from marginal cost (recall
that P/MC(1_B)l). If we assume for the moment that
(7) taft =O ,
andlet depend on a set of market structure characteristics X, so—5—
that
(8) =+ B'X








Empirical examination of the model in equation (9) involves tests of the
hypotheses that B is nonzero and that B is a function of industry
characteristics reflecting market structure.
Estimating Cyclical Movements in Total Factor Productivity
To address the obvious simultaneity problem with using Aq on the
right—hand side of (9), we use an instrumental—variables procedure.
Under the assumption of no common element to productivity disturbances
across industries, we can use an aggregate demand variable as an
instrument (so long as no individual industry is large relative to the
economy). We use current and lagged real GNP growth as such
instruments. As a test of robustness, we also use current and lagged
values of the rate of growth of real military purchases and the rate of
growth of the relative price of imports as (arguably) exogenous
aggregate variables. The use of these instruments does not require
assumptions incompatible with the real business cycle view.—6—
Theomission of individualindustryeffects not captured by our
current information set can bias coefficient estimates obtained by
OLS. The availability of longitudinal data, however, allows us to
account for unobservable time—invariant industry differences. We
estimate the model using the standard fixed—effects, within—group
estimator. As in Hall (1986b,c), we set 3'0, in order to allow
direct comparison of results. Estimations over the period from 1958 to
1981 are carried out using the panel data base of 284 four—digit Census
manufacturing industries described in Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen
(1986a, 1986b). The results are in Table I for all industries and for
decompositions by broad categories: (i) industries producing producer
goods versus consumer goods, (ii) durable goods versus nondurable goods,
and (iii) goods produced to order versus goods produced tostock.4 The
two columns report estimation results using the GNP growth instrument
and the military and imports price instruments, respectively.
Three features of the results presented in Table 1 are particularly
noteworthy. First, under our a8sumption about ujt, the estimatnd value
of the Lerner index ((P—MC)/P) for all industries on average of about
0.36 indicates that price substantially exceeds marginal cost in U.S.
manufacturing. Second, as expected from the inclusion of materials in
variable cost, the estimated price—cost margins are significantly lower
than the value—added markups studied by Hall. Third, there is little
interindustry variation in cyclical movements in productivity (and
implied markups of price over cost) according to the broad categories in
Table1—producer and consumer goods, durable and nondurable goods, and
goods produced to order and stock. Results obtained under the two sets—7
of instruments are qualitatively similar; in the work that follows, we
report only those results using the real GNPgrowthinstruments.
To provide information on a more disaggregated level, we pool the
four—digit industry data into two—digit groups. Estimates of equation
(9) maIntaining ''0for each two—digit industry group are reported in
Table 2. We use these estimates in summary fashion in Table 3. The
first two columns of Table 3 report the labor and materials shares in
the value of output (tabulations are averages over the 1958—1981
period); there is considerable variation in the data, but in all cases
the materials share is large relative to the labor share. The text two
columns contrast Rail's (1986b) implied estimates of the price—cost
margin5 with estimates using the data described above which include
materials in measuring costs. The last column is presented for purposes
of comparison with calculations from the raw data, and shows the Census
price—cost margin6 exclusive of payments to non—production workers
("overhead labor").
-
Hallconcluded that there was substantial market power in the
paper, chemicals, primary metals, and transportation equipment
industries. Each of these industries has substantial materials shares
in output. Moreover, comparing the rankings in the third and fourth
columns points up some important differences. For example, none of the
industry groups noted by Hall has an estimated markup of price over
marginal cost greater than that for all industries reported in Table 1.
Both the findings we present and those of Hall attribute the
procyclical movements in total factor productivity to a significant gap
between industry price andmarginalcost. Strictly speaking, however,
the empirical results could be explained in a competitive setting given—8—
specification errors. Hall (1986d) goes through a careful review of
potential biases——most notably through cyclical variation in work
effort, measurement errors in hours, the possibility of increasing
returns to scale, and the possibility of sticky prices——and shows them
to be very small, and often in a direction amplifying our results. We
do not repeat such an analysis here.
UI.EXPLAHATIONSVOR PROCYCLICAL RHAVIOROF ThESOL(I RESIDUAL
Procyclica]. Solow Residuals and Perfect Competition
The discussion in the previous section indicates some testable
hypotheses regarding links between the markup of price over marginal
cost and the Solow residual. Before proceeding to econometric work,
however, we consider a possible alternative explanation for the observed
procyclical movements in total factor productivity ——theexistence of
aggregate real business cycles.7 A key identifying assumption in our
model and that of Hall is that productivity disturbances across broad
industry groups are uncorrelated.8 An alternative interpretation of the
procyclical movement of the Solow residual is that industries are
characterized by perfect competition (in the sense that price equals
marginal cost), but that productivity disturbances are correlated across
industry groups; that is, there is an aggregate real business cycle in
the economy. Rail dismisses this possibility by assumption. We provide
some evidence on this point below.
Our approach is a simple one; we consider the correlations in
innovations iii the Solow residual across industries. High positive
correlations would indicate that our identifying assumption aboutujt is—9—
a poor one; that is, "real business cycles" would be important.9
Operationally, we estimate equation (9) for all industries,
setting 0, and calculate the simple correlations of the innovations
across four—digit classifications. We then average the correlations
across two—digit classifications, in order to provide useful summary
statistics.'° The results of this procedure for some selected two—digit
industries are reported" In Tabi 4A.
Although the averaging of correlations makes a formal test
difficult, it is clear that the estimated correlations are quite small,
and sometimes negative. There is only limited support for the notion of
real business cycle effects; correlations over the post—1973 period are
generally larger than those estimated for the 1958—1973 period,
reflecting the oil shocks during the 1970s.
Negative correlation is evidence against the productivity—shock
explanation of the cycle, however. Imposing the extremely strong prior
that negative correlations across four—digit classifications must he
spurious leads to the results reported'2 in Table 5A. Even there,
correlations are "large" only for the post—1973 period. We note that
our model accounts only for disembodied tech Ical change. The residuals
used to obtain these correlations still may contain a cyclical component
which should be positively correlated across industries, due the
embodiment of technological change not accounted for in the model; i.e.,
vintage effects could he important, but we still find the correlations
to be small. tn summary the assumption in Hall (1986c) and in the
empirical work below—that movements in productivity growth are not
causal factors explaining the business cycle——is consistent with the
data.— 10—
Thecorrelations reported in Tables 4A and 48 iy be biased
dowiward if, indeed, the real business cycle is reflected in GNP, given
that aggregate output is used as an instrumentable variable in the
regressions. The same sets of correlations are reported in Tables 4B
and 58, based on residuals produced from equation (9) based on the use
of the exogenous military spending and import price variables as
instruments. Although the reported correlations increase slightly over
those reported in Tables 4A and 4B, the increases are very small, and
our qualitative conclusions remain unchanged.
Imperfect Competition and the Price—Cost Margin: Market—Structure Effects
As noted in section II, the explanation for the observed
procyclical movements in the Solow residual on which we focus our
attention is that price exceeds marginal cost in most industries; that
is, information about price—cost markups can be inferred from estimating
models of the form of equation (9). It is possible to test, then,
whether variation in such estimated markups across groups of industries
reflects differences in market structure. While such differences in
market structure are difficult to define operationally, we consider
three measures—industry concentration (as measured by the four—firm
concentration ratio),'3 import competition, and unionization. Each is
discussed in turn below.
Theory gives some guidance here as to the expected magnitudes of
the Lerner index of market power as a function of market structure and
industry behavior. For a given industry, a firm's price—cost margin can
be expressed as— 11—
P—MC1 s(1-i$)
P
where Sjisthe firm's market share, qisits conjectural variation
(the ith firm's guess about the output response of all other firms),
and n is the industry demand elasticity. Some reference points of
interest include the monopoly outcome, PM—1/n,and the Cournot
outcome, PCMs./n.
Weuse industry data, and we can derive industry expressfons by
aggregating across firms. For example, if marginal cost were equal to
average variable cost for each firm,themonopoly and Cournot outcomes
become PM1/nand PCM —H/ri,respectively where H is the Herfindahi
index of concentration.14 Usingreasonableassumptions about demand
elasticities and Herfindahi indices, Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen
(1986c) concluded using Census data that price—cost margins (the
relative markup of price over cost inclusive of the cost of materials)
were much closer to the Cournot predictions than the monopoly
predictions. This finding is consistent with the results in recent
cross—sectional studies by Alberts (1984) and Salinger (1984).
Employing the same panel data used here, we found in Domowitz,
Hubbard, and Petersen (1986a, 1986b) evidence of only a weak positive
association between concentration and Census price—cost margins. Our
basic data for four—firm concentration ratios (C4) across industries and
over time are taken from the Census of Manufactures. For some
industries, however the concentration measurements reported by the
Census are significantly biased because of inappropriate specification
of product boundaries by the SIC classifications, or for those
industries for which markets are regional instead of national because of— 12—
lowvalue—to—weight ratios. We make use of a met culous study by Weiss
and Pascoe (1981), which adjusts concentration ratios for inappropriate
product groupings and geographic fragmentation.
We report in Table 6 results for estimating the basic model in (9)
for various concentration groupings. The first two rows report margin
estimates according to'5 C450 or C4 > 50. The lack of difference in
the two estimates is striking. In the next two rows, we decompose
concentrated industries into producer—goods and consumer—goods
categories. The estimated margin is higher in consumer—goods
industries.'6 It is clear from the estimates in Table 6 that
procyclical movements in the Solow residual do not depend importantly on
domestic industry concentration.
An obvious qualification to these results is that the measure of
concentration used ignores the role of entry by foreign firms, an
important phenomenon in recent years. Recent studies have isolated
important effects of import competition on price—cost margins (see for
example Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen, 1986a; and the review of
studies in Caves, 1985). We account for the role of import competition
by multiplying the concentration ratio by one minus the imports—to—sales
ratio (Ifs). From equation (8), we allow to be a function of this
adjusted concentration ratio, so that
(8') 8 +C4j(1—(I/S)j).
Coefficient estimates corresponding to the model in equation (9) are
reported in Table 7 for the broad categories enumerated in Table I.
Concentration differences do not appear to be important for all— 13—
industrieson average or for producer—goods industries. Concentration
effect8 are important, though, in consumer—goods industries and in
durable—goods industries. The relative importance of industry
concentration for explainir margins in consumer—goods industries as
opposed to producer—goods industries is consistent with the evidenc. for
Census price—cost margins in Domowitz, Hubbard and Petersen (1986a).
The strongresultsfor durable—goods industries are of interest, since
theseindustriescomprise the most cyclical portion of U.S.
manufacturl ng.
We also consider the proposition that imperfect competition in the
labor market is important. Several recent studies have found a negative
relationship between unionization and measures of industry
profitability.'7 Specifically, we analyze jointly the effects of
concentration and unionization on the implied margin. That is, we




where % UNIONrefersto the percentage of workers unionized in the ith
industry.To quantify the role of unionism, we use data on the
percentageof total workers covered by union bargaining agreements
reported for three—digit S.I.C. industries in Freeman and Medoff
(1979).18 Freeman and Medoff point out that no consistent longitudinal
data on unionization exist; we treat the Freentan—Medoff series as a
fixed effect. Results for the categories of industries considered in
Table 7 are presented in Table 8. While there is evidence for a slight
positive effect of concentration on the estimated margin for all— 14—
industriesin general, that effect is again most economically important
for consumer—goods industries and durable—goods industries as in Table
7. It is clear from the coefficient estimates that while concentration
Is not generally important in explaining the interindustry variation
in B, unionization is. There are two features of these results. The
results for all industries imply that the estimate of B is reduced by
aboutone—third when union coverage equals 100 percent relative to when
itis zero.19That is,unionsare obtaining part of the rents implied
bythe positive markup of price over marginal cast. The most
substantial effect of unions on the estimated margin is found in
durable—goods industries. Second, with respect to cyclical movements in
the Solow residual, these results suggest that "labor hoarding" is less
important in unionized industries (i.e., that layoffs in bad times are
more common).
The estimates reported in Tables 7 and 8 ignore the Interactive
effect of the industry—specific rate of Hicks—neutral technological
progress on the concentration, import competition, and unionization
measures. In effect, the coefficients on those variables may be
interpreted as embodying the average rate of technical progress in a
random—coefficients model of such a process. An alternative approach is
to assume that the rate of technological change varies among the two—
digit industrial categories, but is identical within two—digit
classifications. As results based on this assumption difFered little
from those in Tables 7 and 8, we do not present them here.
The clear conclusion of the previous section is that price
substantially exceeds marginal cost in U.S. manufacturing industries,
though markups and the implied procyclical moveimnts in the Solow— 15—
residualare notsignificantlyrelated to differences in industry
concentration.
IV.IMPLICAflONSOF01Gfl INDUSTRY MARKUPS
ttis of course, important to reconcile the notion of relatively
high price—cost markups with low average observed profit rates. The
explanation must be the existence of relatively large fixed costs of
production. The identity of these fixed costs is of interest for policy
considerations. If fixed costs are traceable primarily to capital,
considerable "excess capacity" mayexistin U.S. manufacturing, and
output can be expanded without greatly elevating marginal cost. If the
source of fixed cost is not primarily capital, adding more labor to the
production process will probably reduce the marginal product of labor.
In this case, high price—cost margins mayexistin equilibrium together
with a rapidly rising marginal cost schedule should firms expand output
much beyond average levels of production.
To provide a connection between the markups of price over marginal
cost estimated in section III and observed rates of profit (relatve to




whereM represents the unit cost of matertals, F and F' represent fixed
costs of capital and other fixed costs, respectively, and ir represents
pure profit.— 16—
Table9 reports two categories of non—capital fixed costs of
production——plant overhead labor (payments to non—production workers)
and central office expenditures. Central office expenditures consist of
both central office workers and advertising. Defining managerial labor
to be a fixed input and production workers to be a variable input is
likely to lead to an underestimate of the true degree of the fixed labor
cost if there is any labor hoarding. The estimates in the second column
in Table 9 then are probably underestimates of the true degree of fixed
labor costs.
Comparing the first column of Table 3 with the second column of
Table 9 reveals that for many industries, the managerial component of
labor expenditures is rarly as great as that for production workers.
That is, overhead labor is likely to b' a very important component of
fixed cost. Good examples are industry groups 25 (printing and
publishing) and 38 (instruments and related products), which also have
the highest estimated price—cost margins. It is also apparent that some
industries have significant levels of central office expenditures——For
example, 21 (tobacco products) and 28 (chemicals and allied products).
Average industry capital—output ratios are reported in the fourth column
of Table 9. Given any reasonable assumption about rates of depreciation
and the cost of capital (see for example the estimates in Jorgenson and
Sullivan, 1981), the fixed costs attributable to the sum of plant
overhead labor and central office expenditures are as large as those
attributable to capital for most industry groups.
An "adjusted margin" is computed in the fifth column by subtracting
the two categories of fixed costs from the price—cost margin estimated
previously. The adiusted margin in most industries is below 0.30, with— 17
the exceptions being industry groups 21 (tobacco products), 27 (printing
and publishing), 32 (stone, clay, and glass products), and 38
(instruments and related products). It is clear from the last two
columns in the table that average profit rates will be low for most
industries, as expected; exceptions include industry groups 21 (tobacco
products), 27 (printing and publishing), and 38 (instruments and related
products).
Hall (1986a, 1986b) argues that the joint occurrence of high
margins and low average profit rates is explained by "chronic excess
capacity" in manufacturing industries. Such a situation could be
consistent with equilibrium n an industry where minimum optimal scale
is a large fraction of total industry output.2° However, minimum
efficient scales relative to industry output In U.S. manufacturing are
typically quite small (see for example Scherer, etal., 1975; and
Scherer, 1980), so that It is difficult to imagineanIndustry
equilibrium with substantial excess capacity for this reason alone.
Moreover, engineering and economic studies have largely concluded that
long—run cost curves at the plant level are much less steep at
suboptImalplant scales than is suggested by many textbook diagrams
(Schereretal., 1975; Weiss, 1975). Scherer, etal. (1975) calculate
the percentage increase In unit costs in the long run as a consequence
of operating at only one—third of the siz of the minimum efficient
scale,and find themgenerally to he not verysignificant.
Whileexcess capacity in capital does not seem to be of primary
importance here, it would he interesting to consider the possibility of
'excess labor" based on, say, specific—human—capital considerations In
manufacturing industries. If labor were perceived incorrectly In the— 18—
dataas being entirely variable cost, then measured average variable
cost would exceed marginal cost, providing a partial explanation for the
gap between price—cost markups and observed profit rat's noted by Hall
and for the procyclical movements of Census price—cost margins (which
are defined with respect to average variable cost) noted by Domowitz,
Hubbard, and Petersen (1986a,1986b).
V •O1KLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Links between the industrial organization of markets and
macroeconomic outcomes are receiving increasing theoretical and
empirical attention. We begin by exploiting the connection researched
by Rail that procyclical movements in productivity are reflective of
imperfect competition in industrial product markets. 8y using highly
disaggregated data on U.S. manufacturing industries, we are able to test
explicitly for the influences on markups of price over margins' cost and
total factor productivity movements over the cycle of such market—
structure variables as industry concentration and the extent of
unionization and foreign competition. Our principal findings were
stated in the introduction.
Our findings indicate two promising extensions for future
research. First, the relative importance of union effects over measures
of concentration in explaining markups in homogeneous—goods
manufacturing industries points firmly in the direction of an explicit
consideration of cyclical movements in costs in industrfes characterized
by imperfect competition in both labor and product markets. Second, to— 19—
theextent that price exceeds marginal cost in many industries, firms
are demand—constrained, so long as marginal cost is constant or not too
steeplysloped over the relevant range. Further research on the shape
of marginal cost schedules may thus have important implications for
macroeconomics as well as for industrial economics.— 20—
Notes
1 See forexample the papers by Hart (1982), Mankiw (1985), Akerlof and
Yellen (1985), Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1985), Hubbard and Weiner
(1985), and Rotemberg and Saloner (1986a).
2 Thatis, the phenomenon of "real business cycles," in which industry
productivity movements are highly correlated (because of coimson rea
shocks) is ruled out. We return to this point later.
The magnitude of the overstatement clearly depends on the magnitude
of w. We find (see Table 1) that Aisapproximately 0.5 on average,
and that there is substantial variation across industries) at the
4—digit level of disaggregation.
The producer—goods/consumer—goods classification is taken from
Ornstein (1975). Ornstein's classification is based on the percentage
of shipments of output for final demand in four categories;
consumption, investment, materials, and government. If fifty percent
or more of an industry's output went to consumption, it was cla8sified
as a consumer goods industry; if fifty percent of more went to
investment plus materials, it was classified as a producer—goods
industry. Information for the classification of industries according
to"produce—to—order" versus "produce—to—stock" was taken from Belsley
(1969). Durable—goods and nondurable—goods industrieswere defined as
follows.Durable goods are assumed to be canital goods——for use
either by,households or firms. With few exceptions, the set of
durable—goods industries includes the fo lowing two—digit categories:
25 (Furniture), 35 (Machinery Except Electrical Machinery), 36
(Electronic Equipment), 37 (Transportation Equipment), and 38
(Instruments arid Related Products). Exceptions include the following
four—digit industries: 3562 (Ball Bearings), 3565 (Industry
Patterns), 3625 (Carbon and Graphite Products), 3691 (Storage
Batteries), 3692 (Primary Batteries—Dry and Wet), and 3694 (Engine
ElectricalEquipment).
Hall estimated the price—cost ratio (P/NC), which is converted to a
price—cost margin ((P—MC)/P) in Table 1.
6 Thisversion of the Census price—cost margin is defined as
Value Added—Production Worker Payroll
Value Added +Costof Materials
Another possibility which we do not consider in much detail is that
important cyclical movements in the labor share exist in the data as a
result of overtime and that the marginal cost of labor exceeds the
straight—time wage (see for example Bus, 1985). Overtime hours
relative to total hours are nontrivial in many manufacturing
industries (see the summary information below), but the labor share is
sufficiently small that distortions in the margin are not very
significant.— 21—




















Data on overtime hours are taken from Employment arid Earnings,
United States, 1909—1985; U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of
Labor Statistics, 1986.
8
It is, of course, likely that within a two—digit category,
productivity innovations are correlated across constituent four—digit
industries.
The model of Kydland and Prescott (1982) depends on an aggregate pro-
ductivity disturbance as the driving variable for the cycle. Some
models employed in the literature on real business cycles (in
particular that of Long and Plosser, 1983) do, however, produce
cyclical fluctuations with shocks uncorrelated across sectors.
10 Let the4—digit indices I and j runovertwo—digit industries I and
J, and suppose that there are N four—digit industries in I and M four—
digit industries in 1 and M four—digit industries in J. Let e
denote a residual from equation (9) for a four—digit industry I.The
estimated covariance between industries I andIis
(l/T) e1
Thecovarlancebetween I and J is then
estimated as (1/MN)
''The industries are textiles (22), lumber (24), chemicals(28),
petroleum (29), rubber (30), primary metals (33), machinery (35),
andmotorvehicles (37). This list includes basic industries for
which productivity shocks maybeImportant, and excludes "secnndary
industries;" e.g., lumber andwood(24) is included, but furniture— 22
and paner are not. Chemicals, petroleum, and rubber require consid-
eration given the Importance of oil shocks.
'2Negative correlations are simply set to zero in the averaging
process. Otherwise, the calculations are the same as for Table 5.
'3We do not have data on Herfindahi indices, but they are highly
positively correlated with the four—firm concentration ratio.
14That is,Hs .Time—seriesdata on Herfindahi indices are
not available. However, all available evidence at the four—digit
level of disaggregation, including the thorough (though somewhat
dated) study by Nelson (1963), indicate that H values above 0.35
are very rare.
15The results were not particularly sensitive to the choice of dividing
i,oint.
16The concentrated producer—goods industries correspond to
the trigger—pricing industries examined by Green and Porter (1984) and
Rotemberg and Saloner (1986b). See the more detailed discussion In
Dotnowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen (1986c).
17Several recent studies have found that unions reduce industry price—
cost margins; see for example Freeman (1983), Salinger (1984), Karier
(1985), and Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen (1986b).
8The data are averages from information gathered in 1966, 1970, and
1972 by the Bureau of Labor Statistics Expenditures on Employee
Compensation Surveys.
'9Th1s compares with estimated reductions in Census price—cost margins
of 17—23 percent in Freeman (1983) and 25 percent in Domowitz,
Hubbard, and Petersen (1986b).
2011a11's assertion of thainberlin an competition may well be accurate for
industries engaged in the production of consumer goods, where product
differentiation is important. OnecanImagine that advertising and
investment in building "brand loyalty" are the important fixed
costs. It is harder to make such arguments for industries
manufacturing homogeneous producer goods.— 23—
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ESTIMATES0? CYCLICAL EFFECT Oh PROI3UCTIVITY*




Set of Industries q R
All Industries 0.363 0.877 0.376 0.878
(0.004) (0.004)
Producer Goods 0.365 0.882 0.373 0.883
(0.004) (0.004)
Consumer Goods 0.353 0.861 0.368 0.864
(0.010) (0.OOR)
Durable Goods 0.377 0.912 0.397 0.919
(0.007) (0.006)
Nondurable Goods 0.356 0.865 0.362 0.866
(0.005) (0.004)
Produce to Order 0..366 0.883 0.377 0.886
(0.004) (0.004)
Produce to Stock 0.336 0.855 0.354 0.858
(0.011) (0.007)
*The equations were estimated usingfixedeffects and instrumental
variables, as described in the text. Corrected standard errors are
in parentheses. The estimation interval was1958to 1981.TABI.E 2
ESTIMATES OF CYCLICALrCT(I PPODUCTIVITY*
(For Two—Digit Categories of MamifacturingIndustries)
_2
IndustryGroup R
20: Food and Kindred Products 0.307 0.830
(0.02 1)
21: Tobacco Products 0.481 0.966
(0.087)
22: Textile Mill Products 0.258 0.801
(0.02 1)
23: Apparel 0.324 0.857
(0.022)
24: Lumber and Wood Products 0.287 0.872
(0.082)
25: FurnIture and Fixtures 0.391 0.941
(0 •014)
26: Paper and Allied Products 0.322 0.869
(0.023)
27: Printing and Publishing 0.547 0.926
(0.023)
28: Chemicals and Allied 0.349 0.895
Products (0.022)
29: Petroleum and Coal 0.320 0.931
Products (0.020)
30: Rubber and Miscellaneous 0.357 0.933
Plastic Products (0.040)





32: Stone, Clay, and 0.432 0.930
Glass Products (0.011)
33: Primary Metals 0.266 0.891
(0.009)
34: Fabricated Metals 0.394 0.908
(0.0 10)
35: Machinery, Except Electrical 0.378 0.926
(0.012)
36: Electric Machinery, 0.399 0.922
Electronic Equipment (0.011)
37: Transportation 0.259 0.856
Equipment (0.019)
38: Instruments and 0.516 0.952
Related Products (0.023)
*The equations were estimated using fixed effects and Instrumental
variables, as described in the text. The estimation interval was













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































29 .099 .098 .084
30 .025 —.041 .118 .035
33 .185 .280 .051 .201 .074
35 —.068 —.013 —.021 —.050 —.085 —.071





29 —.071 .019 .061
30 .135 .049 .184 .016
33 .156 .r67 .041 .118 .255
35 —.045 .004 —.058 —.001 —.189 .369





29 .080 .172 .051
30 —.087 —.125 —.022 —.055
33 .270 .412 .041 .211 —.116
35 —.050 —.121 .017 —.146 .049 —.095
37 .290 .418 —.019 .313 —.064 .275 —.120
*sed on 92 four—digit industries. Residuals are taken from equation
(9) in the text, with B 0.TABLE 4B







29 .108 .119 .093
30 .036 .011 .120 .043 ——
33 .202 .306 .064 .219 .102
35 —.054 —.022 —.025 —.040 —.091 —.067 ——





29 .072 —.016 .049
30 .116 —.100 .178 .178
33 .136 .106 .015 .114 .185
35 —.067 .011 —.048 —.017 —.200 —.095





29 .162 .266 .109
30 —.016 —.010 —.029 —.035
33 .360 .525 .124 .332 —.071
35 .006 —.040 —.009 —.082 .021 —.040
37 .307 .450 .080 .364 .002 .377 —.048
*Based on 92 four—digit industries. Residuals are taken from equation
(9) in the text, with 0.TA8LE 5A






29 .136 .139 .164
30 .127 .093 .195 .124 ——
33 .223 .292 .138 .221 .137
35 .080 .087 .112 .078 .089 .085





29 .148 .125 .171
30 .222 .113 .302 .139
33 .216 .214 .150 .186 .285 ——
35 .110 .111 .125 .146 .098 .109





29 .178 .223 .209
30 .139 .099 .126 .179
33 .347 .442 .218 .296 .106
35 .152 .131 .195 .093 .204 .146
37 .371 .460 .190 .342 .236 .350 .137
*Based on 92 four—dIgit Industries. Residuals are taken from equation
(9) in the text with B0. Negative four—digit correlations are
truncated at zero.TABLE 51






29 .143 .150 .173
30 .135 .113 .197 .131
33 .235 .315 .148 .237 .150
35 .086 .094 .109 .086 .086 .090





29 .143 .113 .161
30 .210 .045 .309 .140
33 .201 .178 .137 .175 .240
35 .102 .117 .132 .140 .094 .101





29 .227 .288 .254
30 .160 .153 .137 .209
33 .414 .534 .282 .381 .127
35 .185 .196 .188 .127 .206 .183
37 .378 .487 .268 .388 .269 .422 .184
*Based on 92 four—digIt industries. Residuals are taken from equation
(9) In the text with 0. Negative four—digit correlations are
truncated at zero.TABLE 6
NEASURING EFFECTS OF ())NCENTRATION AimSTRATIC RERAVIOR ON MARGINS*
_2
Industries (Concentration Grouping) R
C4 (50 0.363 0.877
(0.005)
C4 > 50 0.365 0.885
(0.007)
C4 > 50 0.360 0.875
(Producer Goods) (0.008)
C4 > 50 0.393 0.891
(Consumer Goods) (0.005)
*The equations were estimated usingfixedeffects and instrumental
variables, as described in the text. Corrected standard errors are
in parentheses. The estimation interval was1958to 1981.TABLE 7
CONCENTRATION,IMPORT OX1PETITION, AND M&RGIIIS*
_2 Industries C4(1—I/S) C4(1—I/S) q R
Al]. Industries 0.009 0.351 0.021 0.880
(0.007) (0.013) (0.028)
Producer Goods 0.017 0.362 —0.003 0.883
(0.009) (0.014) (0.029)
Consumer Goods —0.005 0.263 0.235 0.877
(0.012) (0.038) (0.093)
DurableGoods —0.029 0.294 0.209 0.914
(0.015) (0.030) (0.060)
Nondurable Goods 0.018 0.365 —0.032 0.873
(0.008) (0.015) (0.031)
Produce to Order 0.010 0.347 0.036 0.878
(0.009) (0.015) (0.031)
Produce to Stock 0.006 0.370 —0.059 0.881
(0.012) (0.040) (0.075)
*The equations were estimated using fixed effects and instrumental
variables, as described in the text. Corrected standard errors are
in parentheses. The estimation interval was 1958 to 1981.TABLE 8
CONCENTRATION,UNIONIZATION, AND NARGINS*
_2
!ndustries C4(1—I/S) C4(1—I/S) g Z UNION (Eg) R
All Industries 0.009 0.431 0.054 —0.140 0.875
(0.007) (0.018) (0.029) (0.020)
Producer Goods 0.019 0.457 0.030 —0.158 0.880
(0.009) (0.020) (0.029) (0.020)
Consumer Goods —0.005 0.304 0.269 —0.090 0.866
(0.012) (0.051) (0.102) (0.070)
Durable Goods —0.030 0.478 0.163 —0.242 0.915
(0.014) (0.049) (0.059) (0.050)
Nondurable Goods 0.020 0.423 —0.002 —0.104 0.868
(0.008) (0.020) (0.033) (0.030)
Produce to Order 0.014 0.430 0.066 —0.143 0.874
(0.009) (0.020) (0.032) (0.020)
Produce to Stock—0.004 0.409 —0.064 —0.005 0.875
(0.012) (0.058) (0.096) (0.009)
*The equations were estimated using fixed effects and instrumental
variables, as described in the text. Corrected standard errors are in
parentheses. The estimation interval was1958to 1981.A
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